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INTRODUCTION

Background
Traditionally it has been assumed that …rms maximise pro…ts. However in the presence of market distortions, it is not typically the case that owners will wish …rms to maximise pro…ts. The usual justi…cation for pro…t maximisation is the Fisher Separation Theorem (see Milne (1974) , Milne (1981) ), which says that if there are no externalities, the …rm has no market power and …nancial markets are complete, all shareholders will wish to maximise the value of the …rm. This result does not apply if there are externalities between the …rm and its shareholders. In this case, shareholders will not just care about the e¤ect of …rm's decisions on their wealth but will also care about the direct (externality) e¤ects of the decisions upon their utility.
For instance, a shareholder who lives near a factory with a smoking chimney, will want less production than the pro…t maximising level and less production than one who lives further away. Thus we see both disagreement between shareholders and deviations from pro…t maximisation.
Although we use pollution as an example of an externality, it is not the most important one. Another is the dislike that many people have from investing in …rms, which behave in socially irresponsible ways, such as supporting repressive regimes or damaging the environment. Alternatively the externality could be interpreted as private bene…ts of control, perquisites (see Jensen & Meckling (1976) ) or other services not captured by market variables. These are the externalities discussed most often in the corporate control literature. We suspect that these are important factors in proxy …ghts and takeover contests. Other examples are …rm-speci…c investments provided by workers or managers (see section 5).
If there is imperfect competition, the Fisher Separation Theorem breaks down in two ways. Firstly, in general, there will be disagreement between di¤erent shareholders about the policy of the …rm. Secondly, typically, no shareholder will wish to maximise pro…ts. The Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply if there is imperfect competition, since in that case, a change in the …rm's production plan will a¤ect prices as well as shareholders'wealth. Pro…ts are not well de…ned since there will be more than one price system in terms of which pro…ts can be expressed. If the …rm changes its production plan typically a shareholder's old budget set will not be a subset of the new one and no unambiguous comparisons can be made.
As argued above, in the presence of market distortions, shareholder unanimity cannot be guaranteed. However it is still the case that there are some decisions on which all members of the control group will agree. Firstly we show that, under some assumptions, for any plan which is not productively e¢ cient, there will be some production plan which is unanimously preferred. Secondly, all members of the control group will agree that the …rm should produce less/more than the pro…t-maximising level of negative/positive externalities. Thus conventional pro…t-maximising models may have overstated the size of the distortions due to externalities. Thirdly if the …rm has monopoly power all will agree on the desirability of using a 2-part tari¤.
Modelling Firm' s Decisions
We consider an economy with externalities and/or monopoly. As we argue above, there is a no unambiguous justi…cation for assuming pro…t maximisation when markets are distorted. However, it is not clear what the alternative should be. At present there is no widely accepted economic model of the internal decision-making of …rms.
To resolve this we propose a relatively general model. Despite the generality, our model is able to make a number of predictions concerning equilibrium behaviour.
The …rm is modelled as a collection of individuals, each of whom is maximising his/her utility. Decisions are made by a process of aggregating the preferences of a group of decision-makers within the …rm.
One possibility, is to assume decisions are made by a majority vote of shareholders, see for instance Hart & Moore (1996) or Renstrom & Yalcin (2003) . If the …rms'choice is one-dimensional (e.g. price), it will be determined by the median shareholders' preference. However one can object to these models by arguing that, in practice, management have more in ‡uence than shareholders. To model this, we assume that decisions are made by a group of individuals, which we shall refer to as the control group. We do not make speci…c assumptions about the composition of the control group since our model does not require them. For example, the control group could consist of shareholders and senior management.
At present there is no widely accepted theory of the internal structure of the …rm (for recent surveys of the governance literature see Shleifer & Vishny (1997) , Allen & Gale (2000) and Tirole (2001) ). For this reason we use an abstract model. We make, what we believe to be the mild assumption, that the …rm's procedures respect unanimous preferences within the control group. Such rules would include, inter alia, those which give a major role for management.
Another major point of this paper is to emphasize the connection between traditional public economics and the theory of the …rm. We can think of the …rm as an entity which provides local public goods, e.g. pro…ts and private bene…ts of control to shareholders and/or employees (see Holmstrom (1999) ). This establishes a connection between our model of a …rm and the theory of a public project in an economy with symmetric information and real or pecuniary externalities.
Our model does not deal with asymmetric information or competing oligopolistic …rms. To incorporate asymmetric information we would require a general equilibrium model with asymmetric information. Such models exist (see Prescott & Townsend (2000) ) but address the issues in terms of competitive clubs. Related issues, which arise in the context of incomplete markets and oligopoly are discussed in Kelsey & Milne (1996) and Kelsey & Milne (2003) .
Organisation of the Paper
This paper aims to provide a general framework to model the internal decision-making of …rms. In section 2 we present a general equilibrium model with externalities and/or monopoly. We begin the characterisation of equilibrium by showing that it is independent of the choice of numeraire and that, under some conditions, it is productively e¢ cient. It is di¢ cult to get clear comparative statics or policy conclusions when there are multiple distortions. For this reason the two subsequent sections consider externalities without monopoly and monopoly without externalities. Section 3 shows a case where externalities are partially internalised within the control group leading 4 to a Pareto improvement on the Walrasian equilibrium. Returning to the monopoly problem, similar reasoning shows that if the control group are consumers of the …rm's products and the monopolist uses uniform pricing then the price will be below the usual monopoly level. Again the distortion is partially internalised. However this involves cutting price to nonmembers of the control group as well, hence some pro…t has been lost. The natural response is to practice price discrimination, which we study in section 4. We show that perfect price discrimination implies Pareto e¢ ciency and that the …rm's preferred pricing system can be implemented with two-part tari¤s. In the conclusion we discuss another interpretation of our model, where the …rm is a monopsonist or externalities ‡ow between the …rm and a supplier. In particular we consider hold-up problems within the …rm. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text. This paper is intended to be part of a larger research programme on the theory of the …rm. The aim is that the general existence result can be used in more speci…c settings to derive policy conclusions. In a companion paper, Kelsey & Milne (2003) , we consider the objective function of the …rm in oligopolistic industries. We …nd similar results to those in the present paper. In addition we …nd that the constitution of the …rm can in ‡uence the equilibrium in the product market. This implies that there will be an optimal constitution of the …rm to suit market conditions. Hence we are able to endogenise the objective function of the …rm.
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we consider a general equilibrium model with monopoly and externalities. We have chosen a relatively simple model to illustrate the issues, which arise from endogenising decision-making within …rms. It has been adapted from Edlin, Epelbaum & Heller (1998) to suit our purposes. The model is not intended to be the most general model of imperfect competition. Instead it has been chosen to study the economic e¤ects of the internal organisation of …rms.
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Model
There is a single …rm with market power, …rm 0, which we shall refer to as the monopolist. There is in addition a fringe of F competitive …rms, 1 6 f 6 F .
Markets
The model has J goods. Goods 1 to j; ( j > 1) are competitive goods, while goods j + 1 to J are monopoly goods. Thus we can write a vector of goods as x = hx c ; x m i to denote the competitive and monopoly goods separately. There are markets in all goods. There is no market in shares. Since there is no uncertainty, diversi…cation is not a possible motive for trading shares. We shall use p m 2 R J j and p c 2 R j to denote respectively the price vectors for monopoly goods and competitive goods. Let p = hp c ; p m i denote the price vector. Let P = R J + be the space of all price vectors.
We shall make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 All economic agents including the monopolist are price-takers for competitive goods.
This ensures that at least one market is undistorted. It is almost impossible to derive clear policy implications in economies in which every market is distorted.
Firms
We require …rms to satisfy the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.2 Firm f has production possibilities described by a production func-
1. the function f is assumed to be continuous and concave;
3. the production set, Y f ; is bounded above and non-empty;
Let y = y 0 ; :::; y F ; y f 2 Y f ; denote the economy's production vector and Y = y 0 ; :::; y F : y f 2 Y f ; 0 6 f 6 F the economy's production set.
where z + = hmax f0; z 0 g ; :::; max f0; z F gi :
This says that any unwanted outputs can be disposed of at zero cost.
Assumption 2.4 Firm f is a competitive …rm for 1 6 f 6 F: These …rms are pricetakers for all goods. They neither produce monopoly goods nor use them as inputs,
Firm 0 is a monopolist and is able to set the price for monopoly goods. However it is a price-taker in the market for competitive goods. One can motivate this by observing that, while some …rms are big enough to set some prices, it is unlikely that any given …rm would have su¢ cient market power to set prices for all goods. For instance, one would not expect Microsoft to consider the impact of its decisions on the price of paper since it is relatively small in that market. 1 It would be possible to modify our model so that price taking behaviour for competitive goods could be derived rather than assumed. Consider an economy where the group of competitive goods are always desired by consumers and are produced by a competitive …rm (or industry). Assume the …rm(s) uses a linear technology, which uses the numeraire as an input. 2 As the commodities are always desired in positive amounts, they will be produced and their prices will be set equal to the constant marginal cost in terms of the numeraire. Thus these commodities' prices will be invariant to the monopolist's decision.
Consumers
There are H consumers 1 6 h 6 H: We assume that the consumer h has consumption vector x h , which lies in a consumption set X h R J Y . 
Individual h has a budget constraint: De…nition 2.1 De…ne v h (p; y) = max x h 2X h u h x h ; y ; subject to (1). The function v h represents individual h's induced preferences over the production plans and pricing decisions of the …rms.
Firms'Decisions
As already argued, it is not desirable to assume that the monopolist maximises pro…t.
In addition, since there are externalities between the competitive …rms and their shareholders, the Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply to them either. Instead of pro…t maximisation we assume that …rm f can be represented as maximising a preference relation < f ; de…ned on P Y: Hence, in general, …rm's preferences may depend on the price vector and the output of all …rms. This binary relation will arise from some process of aggregation of the preferences of the control group. In this section we describe the properties of this relation.
We assume that the decisions of …rm f are made by a group of individuals C f f1; :::; Hg, which we shall refer to as the control group of …rm f: Our results do not depend crucially on the composition of the control group, hence we do not need to be more speci…c. We assume that the …rm's preferences depend on the preferences of the control group hv h i h2C f and shareholdings f 1 ; :::; f H . Note that we do not exclude the possibility that individuals, who are not shareholders (e.g. managers), are able to in ‡uence the …rm's preferences. We shall not model the internal decision making of the control group explicitly but simply assume that whatever procedure is used, respects unanimous preferences.
Assumption 2.8 Forf 6 =f ; Cf \ Cf = ;:
This says that there is no overlap between the control groups of di¤erent …rms.
We make this assumption to avoid issues of collusion, which are beyond the scope of the present paper. This is a continuity assumption and is largely technical in nature. We do not need to assume completeness or transitivity of the …rm's preferences. However to prove existence of equilibrium we need the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.11 The …rm's preferences satisfy y : hp; yi f hp;ỹi is convex for 0 6 f 6 F:
Note that we only assume convexity of preferences over goods for a given price vector. Preferences over prices are not necessarily convex. Competitive …rms satisfy the above assumptions. They maximise their preferences taking all prices and any externalities produced by other …rms as given. In contrast, …rm 0 when supplying monopoly goods takes into account the e¤ect of its decisions on the price of monopoly goods and any externalities produced by other …rms. In addition we assume that the preferences of the monopolist are acyclic.
De…nition 2.2 A binary relation < on a set X is said to be acyclic if there do not exist x 1 ; :::; x n 2 X such that x i x i+1 for 1 6 i 6 n 1 and x n x 1 : Assumption 2.12 The preferences of the monopolist, …rm 0, 0 are acyclic.
As is well known from the social choice literature, group preferences are likely to be incomplete or intransitive or both, (see for instance Sen (1970) ). Because of this, we do not assume completeness and/or transitivity. 3 However we do assume acyclcity. This is a weaker assumption than transitivity, which enables us to avoid the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, see Sen (1977) . 4 For some examples of decision procedures for …rms, which satisfy our assumptions see Kelsey & Milne (1996) .
Existence
Next we shall de…ne and demonstrate existence of equilibrium. Although all trade takes place at a single moment of time, the model is formally sequential. First the monopolist, …rm 0, chooses a vector of monopoly goods. Secondly there is trade in competitive goods. At the second stage all agents including the monopolist take prices as given. The vector of monopoly goods is treated as part of the shareholders' endowment. The second stage is a competitive equilibrium with non-standard preferences as in Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975) . The monopolist chooses the initial vector of monopoly goods to achieve its most preferred equilibrium at the second stage. 5
3 Social choice problems may not be as great as they appear at …rst sight. Hansmann (1996) argues that the control groups of …rms have relatively homogenous preferences. Hence the assumption of unrestricted domain, commonly used in social choice theory, may not hold in this context. This is true both of conventional investor-controlled …rms and of various kinds of non-pro…t …rms and cooperatives. 4 The …rm's problem is one of making a choice. In this respect it di¤ers from the Arrow problem of making a social welfare judgement. Arrow required all social alternatives to be ranked. In contrast making a choice merely requires selecting a best element from a set of alternatives. The weaker condition of acyclicity is su¢ cient for the latter problem but not the former. 5 A model with a similar sequential structure is used in Cornwall (1977) .
First we take the output of monopoly goods as exogenous and de…ne an equilibrium for the competitive sector of the economy.
De…nition 2.3 An equilibrium x ; y 0 c ; y 0 ; p jy 0 m relative to a vector of monopoly goods, y 0 m ; consists of an allocation x , a vector of production plans for competitive …rms y 0 ; a vector of competitive goods, y 0 c for the monopolist and a price vector p ; such that:
2. x i maximises u i x i ; y 0 ; y 0 ; subject to p: The vector of monopoly goods, y 0 m ; is taken as given and the consumers, competitive …rms and even the monopolist trade competitive goods taking prices as given.
This makes precise the sense in which the monopolist is a price taker for competitive goods. For any given y 0 m ; there may be one equilibrium, many equilibria or none.
De…nition 2.4 A managerial equilibrium hx ; y ; p i consists of an allocation, x , a production plan for each …rm y ; and a price vector p ; such that:
1. x ; y 0 ; p jy 0 m is an equilibrium relative to y 0 ;
2. there does not exist hx;ỹ;pi such that:
If y 0 m gives rise to multiple equilibria, we assume that the monopolist can choose its preferred equilibrium. In our opinion this is a reasonable way to model a monopolist with power to set prices. The concept of pro…t maximisation is not well-de…ned as the Fisher Separation Theorem fails (for more detail see Milne (1981) ). The following example indicates the problem.
Example 1 Consider an economy with two consumers and two commodities. Each has the non-negative orthant in R 2 as a consumption set and owns half the total endowment and production set. The production set is closed and convex. Thus both consumers have identical budget sets given any choice of y. However, since they have di¤ erent preferences, they can have di¤ erent rankings of the production vectors with price making by the monopolist, (see …gure 1). Theorem 2.1 Provided consumers satisfy Assumptions 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, the monopolist satis…es 2.12 and all …rms satisfy Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11, a managerial equilibrium exists.
Choice of Numeraire
If …rms maximise pro…t and there is imperfect competition, the real equilibrium will depend on the choice of numeraire or more generally the price normalisation rule, see for instance Böhm (1994) . The intuition is clear: in a pure exchange economy, if one individual was given an objective, which depended on the numeraire, then changes in the numeraire could change the real equilibrium. A similar problem arises in an economy with production, if the …rm's objective is to maximise pro…ts in terms of a given numeraire.
This problem does not arise in our model, since production decisions are based on utility maximisation by individuals. Hence the …rm has a real objective. For instance, suppose that decisions of the …rm are made by a majority vote of shareholders. Each one will have preferences which only depend on real consumption, hence the …rm's decisions and consequently the equilibrium will be independent of the numeraire.
Below we show that with our de…nition, equilibrium is independent of the numeraire.
Proposition 2.1 The set of managerial equilibria does not depend on the choice of numeraire.
This result follows from the sequential structure of our model. The second stage is a competitive equilibrium with non-standard preferences and hence is independent of the numeraire for the usual reasons. At the …rst stage the monopolist chooses his/her production plan. As explained above this decision depends only on real variables and hence is also independent of the numeraire.
Productive E¢ ciency
Here we show that monopoly is productively e¢ cient even if it does not necessarily maximise pro…t. To do this we need to assume that there are no externalities.
Assumption 2.13 There are no externalities, i.e. u h x h c ; x h m ; y = u h x h c ; x h m ; 0 for all y 2 Y and 1 6 h 6 H:
Proposition 2.2 Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 2.9, and 2.13 the equilibrium will be productively e¢ cient.
Proposition 2.2 shows that although the Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply, all shareholders will approve a change, which reduces costs while leaving output 13 unchanged. Consider a point which is productively ine¢ cient. Then the monopolist could directly supply output of competitive goods to shareholders in proportion to their shareholdings. Since the original position is productively ine¢ cient, for a small increase, this is possible while leaving the …rm's other net trades unchanged. This implies that the …rm's pro…ts are unchanged. As shareholders are price-takers for competitive goods this will be perceived as making them all better o¤.
The following example shows that if the …rm is not a price-taker in at least one input market, then an owner-manager may choose to be productively ine¢ cient.
Example 2 Ine¢ cient and E¢ cient Monopoly
Consider an economy with two consumers A and B; who have utility functions over two commodities, u i (x 1i ; x 2i );
where i = A; B. Assume that consumer A has an endowment of an input L and wholly owns a production technology, where the input produces commodity 1 via a neoclassical production function f (`). Consumer B has an endowment of commodity 2.
We can construct an Edgeworth Box, where the height is commodity 2 and the length is commodity 1. By varying the amount of`that consumer A puts into the …rm she can alter the dimensions of the box. Assume that consumer A's …rm is a monopoly supplier of commodity 1. It is possible that by reducing her input of`and freely disposing of the remainder she can make herself better o¤, if relative prices move su¢ ciently in her favour, see …gure 2. 7
Alternatively, consider A's …rm to be a perfect price discriminator, where A sets a non-linear price schedule that curves around the indi¤erence curve through B's endowment. Assuming that A supplies inputs`= L, then we have a standard result, that the allocation is Pareto e¢ cient. All the gains from trade are obtained by A.
Consumer B is indi¤erent between trading or merely consuming his endowment of commodity 2. Clearly, in this case A will not reduce her input below L because that will reduce her welfare. Price discrimination is considered in more detail in section 4, where we show more generally that it can lead to e¢ cient outcomes. The reason for the ine¢ ciency of the …rst case is induced by the monopolistic distortion in prices, Figure 2 : Figure 2 which in turn implies ine¢ ciency in input supply.
Our result on productive e¢ ciency could, in principle, be extended to economies with externalities. However care needs to be taken over the appropriate de…nition of productive e¢ ciency. The externalities need to be taken into account when de…ning e¢ ciency. Consider a situation with two …rms, call them …rm A and …rm B. These …rms are otherwise similar except that …rm B produces twice as much pollution per unit of output compared to …rm A. Intuitively, e¢ ciency requires that …rm B should not produce. This could be achieved by counting pollution as an input into the production process. However proceeding in this direction may create problems. In the present paper, each consumer potentially gets an externality from the use of every physical commodity by every …rm. Hence we would need a new good for the e¤ect of each output or input of each …rm on every individual. A total of J (F + 1) H new goods. However with such a large number of goods, productive e¢ ciency is a very weak criterion. It could be criticised as merely saying each process is an e¢ cient way of producing itself. For further discussion of productive e¢ ciency and externalities see Sen (1973) .
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This section presents a special case of the previous model, where there are externalities but no monopoly power. In this case we show a non-pro…t maximising …rm produces less than the pro…t-maximising level of negative externalities. A similar result was proved in a partial equilibrium context by Roemer (1993) , who showed that pollution would be reduced if a …rms'decisions were made by majority voting. We extend this to general equilibrium and to any decision rule which respects unanimity. Our model is also di¤erent because it has multiple …rms and variable labour supply. By similar reasoning we may show that a non-pro…t maximising …rm will produce more positive externalities than a pro…t maximising …rm.
Model
There are two traded goods, a consumption good y and labour L: In addition there is a negative externality, e.g. pollution z; which is not traded but enters into the utility and production functions. We shall normalise the price of y to 1. The price of labour is denoted by w: In order to focus on the e¤ect of externalities, throughout this section we shall assume that all …rms are price-takers.
Consumers
Assumption 3.1 There are H consumers, 1 6 h 6 H: Individual h has utility function: This utility function has two familiar special cases. First where the externality is a pure public bad,
Secondly where utility is additively separable between the externalities produced by di¤erent …rms, u h =
Since utility is quasi-linear, the aggregate labour supply can be written in the form L S = L S (w) :
Firms There are F identical …rms, which produce the consumption good from labour according to the production function y = g (L; z) ; where g is C 2 strictly concave and increasing in both arguments. Firms are assumed to be price-takers on both input and output markets. We assume that all …rms use the same decision rule. No assumptions are imposed on this rule other than that it respects unanimity. Individuals are not, however, assumed to be identical. Hence the …rm faces a nontrivial collective choice problem. To preserve symmetry, we require that consumers all su¤er the same disutility from the externalities produced by any given …rm.
All individuals are assumed to have an equal number of shares in each …rm.
We assume that individuals do not coordinate their voting across di¤erent …rms.
Thus they cannot implement a collusive outcome by reducing output at all …rms simultaneously. 8 We shall only consider symmetric equilibria.
Theorem 3.1 For any decision rule which satis…es unanimity, in symmetric equilibrium, there will less than the pro…t-maximising level of negative externality.
Although we have shown unambiguous results, the reader will have noticed that we required strong assumptions on preferences and production. This should not be surprising as we are dealing with an abstract second best setting, where apparently perverse comparative static results can occur. To see this more clearly, observe that our pro…t-maximising model above can be thought of as an economy, where there are no Lindahl prices for externalities. In contrast the non-pro…t maximising …rm has marginal conditions that mimic Lindahl prices for externalities ‡owing to the control group. Thus our problem is comparing distorted and less distorted economies, neither of which are …rst best.
Consider a partial equilibrium world, where the output and input prices are held constant. If a …rm is faced with additional Lindahl shadow prices for the externality from the control group, it will reduce output of a negative externality, for the usual revealed preference reasons. This intuitive result requires no feedback e¤ects through prices induced from the general equilibrium conditions. It is these e¤ects that can overturn the partial equilibrium intuition. However in general equilibrium strong assumptions are needed since it is di¢ cult to get clear comparative static results when agents' actions are strategic substitutes. We have assumed that if one …rm pollutes more this reduces the marginal bene…t of polluting, hence externalities are strategic substitutes. This seems a natural assumption if the externality is pollution.
The marginal damage of pollution is thought to be increasing in many environmental problems. However, while realistic, it is di¢ cult to establish general comparative static results with this assumption. Comparative statics could be established with less restrictive assumptions if externalities were strategic complements, (see Milgrom & Roberts (1990) , Milgrom & Shannon (1994) ).
Expanding The Control Group
Our preceding observations on Second Best results, imply that it is di¢ cult to make unquali…ed assertions about the welfare implications of expanding the control group.
For example, in a related literature in incomplete asset markets it is well-known (see Hart (1975) , Milne & Shefrin (1987) ) that introducing more markets for asset trading can be welfare reducing. 9 Therefore an increase in the control group, that moves the economy from one second best equilibrium to another, could, in principal, have any welfare result. If the original control group can choose to add or veto the addition of new members, they will only introduce members that enhance the welfare of both old and new members.
Notice that our non-pro…t model allows for transfers, so that new members could compensate existing ones for the bene…ts of entry. In an abstract way this encapsulates the bargaining that occurs in takeovers and mergers, where side-payments and conditions are negotiated by shareholders, management and key employees.
One de…ciency is that there is no obvious limit to the size of the control group.
It could be possible to include all agents in an e¢ cient allocation for the economy and compensate potential losers. In short, the control group would be equivalent to some e¢ cient, all inclusive planning agency. Clearly this is unrealistic as we have omitted any costs of bargaining within the …rm or with potential new members of the control group. Thus we could allow for bargaining costs that rise with the size of the control group. This cost, limiting the size of the control group, is similar to crowding or congestion costs in the theory of clubs, where such costs limit the size and composition of clubs. 10
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
In this section we consider a variant of the model of section 2, where there is monopoly power but no externalities. By similar reasoning to that used in the previous section, we may show that if a monopolist practices uniform pricing it will set a price below the pro…t-maximising level. This will happen if control group members are also consumers of the …rm's output. Starting at the pro…t maximising level, a price reduction has a second order e¤ect on pro…ts but a …rst order e¤ect on the consumer surplus. We shall not discuss this in detail since there is already a fairly large literature on the case where consumers wholly or partially control a uniform pricing monopolist. (See, for instance, Farrell (1985) , Hart & Moore (1996) , Kelsey & Milne (2003) and Renstrom & Yalcin (2003) ).
When a uniform pricing monopolist reduces the price, those within the …rm gain consumer surplus. However cutting price reduces the pro…ts, which can be made from non-members of the control group. This suggests that the …rm would like to practice price discrimination, selling at marginal cost to members of the control group, while charging outsiders a higher price. In practice, discounts for sta¤ are common and discounts for shareholders are not unknown. Hence there is a case for investigating price discrimination with non-pro…t maximising …rms. We focus on the extreme case 1 0 There are obvious parallels with our theory of the …rm and club theory, see Prescott & Townsend (2000) for an explicit connection in a general equilibrium model with asymmetric information. See Cornes & Sandler (1996) , for a survey; and Conley & Wooders (2001) and Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer & Zame (1999) for recent formulations of endogenous clubs embedded in a private market system. of perfect price discrimination. Our main results are that, the outcome will be Pareto optimal and can be implemented by two-part tari¤s. This extends some results of Edlin et al. (1998) , originally proved for pro…t maximising …rms, to general objective functions for the …rm.
Model
The model is similar to that of section 2, the main modi…cations being that we assume no externalities and allow the monopolist to price discriminate. For perfect price discrimination to be possible it is necessary that households should not be able to trade in the goods it produces. Hence we shall require that no individual has any endowment of monopoly goods in this section. Moreover individuals are not able to trade monopoly goods among themselves, hence there are no resale prices for these goods. This enables us to prove e¢ ciency of the equilibrium. To apply calculus techniques, the utility function is C 2 ; the production function is C 1 and both functions satisfy appropriate Inada conditions.
Consumers
Consumers satisfy Assumption 2.6. Let R h be the total amount which individual h pays for monopoly goods. Individual h's income, net of payment to the …rm is I h = p c :! h R h : To prove existence we need to make an additional assumption, which says that the …rm is the only source of monopoly goods. This will be a maintained hypothesis throughout this section. Consumer h has utility function u h x c ; x h m ; y de…ned over competitive and monopoly goods and possibly externalities from the …rms. Individual h's budget constraint for competitive goods is p c :x h c 6 I h : The …rst order condition for the consumer's optimal choice of competitive goods is: 
De…ne u h (p c ) = max xc u h (x c ; 0; y) such that p c :x c 6 p c :! h : Thus u h (p c ) is the reservation utility, which consumer h can obtain if (s)he does not trade with the monopolist. Since we assume that the monopolist is a price-taker for competitive goods, u h (p c ) can be taken as given by him/her.
Monopolist
The monopolist satis…es Assumption 2.1. We retain the assumption of symmetric information, hence there are no incentive compatibility problems. As usual, we can restrict attention to take it or leave it o¤ers. The …rm o¤ers to supply individual h with a bundle x h m of monopoly goods in exchange for (gross) payment R h : Since the monopolist implements unanimous preferences of the control group, the outcome can represented locally by maximising a weighted sum, P M h=1 h u h ; of their utilities for some non-negative weights h : We may normalise the 's by requiring
Hence, we may represent the …rm's behaviour as the solution to the following optimisation problem. Choose hR; x m ; y c i to maximise
to the constraints:
where x m = x 1 m ; :::; x H m and R = R 1 ; :::; R H : The …rst constraint says that nonmembers of the control group must achieve at least as much utility as they could obtain by not trading with the …rm. The second restricts the …rm to using feasible production plans. The …nal constraint is the …rm's budget balance condition. The
Lagrangian for the …rm's optimisation problem is:
Equilibrium
Below we modify our de…nition of equilibrium to allow for price discrimination. As before we consider an economy which is formally sequential. First the monopolist chooses a pro…le of take it or leave it o¤ers hR; x m i : Then all agents including the monopolist trade competitive goods taking prices as given.
De…nition 4.2 A equilibrium given hR; x m i consists of allocations of competitive goods, a vector, y c ; of competitive goods and a price vector for competitive goods, hx c ; y c ; y m ; p c i ; such that:
De…nition 4.3 A PDM (price discriminating monopoly) equilibrium consists of a pro…le of take it or leave it o¤ ers, allocations of competitive goods, a production plan and a price vector for competitive goods, hR ; x c ; x m ; y c ; y m ; p c i ; such that:
1. hx c ; y c ; y m ; p c i is an equilibrium given hR ; x m i ; 2. hR ; x m ; y c ; y m i solves the …rm's optimisation problem (4); Theorem 4.1 Given consumers satisfy Assumptions 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 4.1 and …rms satisfy Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11 and 2.10; a PDM equilibrium exists.
Proof. Given x m and R, which satisfy the participation constraint, we can apply the same type of argument as Lemma A.3 to show there exists a pair hR; x m i ; for which the competitive sector of the economy has an equilibrium. As before we may show that the set of equilibria contingent on hR; x m i is closed. Since the set of attainable allocations is compact, we may assume that R and x are chosen from compact sets.
Since the monopolist's feasible production set is compact and his/her objective is continuous, Lemma A.2 guarantees the existence of a maximum and thus a PDM equilibrium.
E¢ ciency
We shall now demonstrate that the equilibrium is e¢ cient and can be implemented by a 2-part tari¤, which consists of a personalised hook-up fee and a per unit price equal to marginal cost. Intuitively, total surplus can be maximised by setting price equal to marginal cost. Since surplus is maximised, the resulting equilibrium is e¢ cient. T h x h m denotes the total amount consumer h pays for quantity x h m .
To prove e¢ ciency we need to assume that there are no externalities. Henceforth we shall suppress the dependence of u on y:
Theorem 4.2 If Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.13 are satis…ed a PDM equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient and can be implemented by a 2-part tari¤ , in which the monopolist uses marginal cost pricing. 12
This result may have some applications for regulation. Regulated (or nationalised) …rms are unlikely to maximise pro…t. It may be useful to know that their preferred pricing structure will consist of a two-part tari¤. It is not surprising that the …rm will wish to present outsiders with a 2-part tari¤, since this pricing scheme is capable of extracting all their surplus. The …rm also wishes to use a 2-part tari¤ with members of the control group. The reason is that, within the control group, it is desirable to allocate goods e¢ ciently by using marginal cost pricing. Any redistribution between control group members can be achieved in a lump-sum manner by adjusting the hookup fees. To clarify, for non-members of the control group the hook-up fee is equal to the total surplus. For the control group, the hook-up fee is not necessarily equal to total consumer surplus. Instead it is determined by a bargaining process or game within the control group.
An example of such bargaining would be partnerships in accounting or law …rms where salaries and bonuses are determined by various formulae and bargaining in the group. Observe that such …rms have partners (members of the control group) and non-partners. We have not modelled the determination of the control group. For further discussion see section 3.2.
CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of pro…t maximisation has been criticised both on empirical and theoretical grounds. Although we have found a number of di¤erences between pro…t maximising and non-pro…t maximising …rms, we have also shown that some wellknown results are independent of the objective of the …rm. This suggests that many existing results on economics of …rms and industries do not crucially depend on pro…t maximisation.
These arguments provide a possible rationale for controls on foreign ownership and may explain popular suspicion of foreign owned …rms. If the control group of a foreign owned …rm does not su¤er externalities in the domestic economy, then such a …rm would produce the pro…t-maximising level of externalities. By similar reasoning, monopolistic distortions would also be worse in a foreign owned …rm. Hence there 24 may be a case for regulating foreign owned …rms more strictly. Even within a single country, there may be reasons for preferring relatively small locally owned …rms to large national companies. Similarly our analysis of pollution problems, suggests that there may be advantages in having waste disposed of close to its place of production.
This increases the chance that, those a¤ected by negative externalities, will have some in ‡uence on the …rm's decision.
So far the paper has emphasised the involvement of consumers in …rms'decisions.
But our theory is symmetric, so that we could assume the …rm is a monopsonist in some input markets or that there are externalities ‡owing between the …rm and a supplier of inputs. The most common examples are farm-owned marketing organisations or where the …rm is owned by suppliers of a particular form of labour. So long as the …rm acts competitively in all markets, except those for its own inputs, our arguments on productive e¢ ciency continue to apply. Now let us turn to speci…c cases, where the supplier of the input can be in ‡uential in the decisions of the …rm.
Assume that there are negative externalities between the …rm and its suppliers.
Then, as before, a non-pro…t maximising …rm will produce less of such externalities.
A special case of an externality arises from the hold-up problem. Assume that suppliers may make …rm-speci…c investments, which are non-contractible, e.g. in human
capital. Ex-post, the …rm can appropriate these investments. This imposes a negative externality on the suppliers of inputs and hence reduces the incentive to provide …rm speci…c investments.
With conventional …rms there will be too little …rm-speci…c human capital in equilibrium. However as already noted, a non-pro…t maximising …rm will produce fewer negative externalities. Thus the hold-up problem will be reduced, and input suppliers will be more willing to supply …rm-speci…c inputs, which brings about a Pareto improvement. It would be desirable to include all the suppliers so long as they are productive and add to the group's welfare. Observe that it is in the interest of the control group of the …rm to include agents that su¤er from the externality or bene…t from the supply of …rm speci…c human capital, given appropriate transfers.
This case relates directly to some recent papers on the theory of the …rm (see Hart & Moore (1990) , Hart & Moore (1996) and Roberts & Steen (2000) , where the initial members of the control group …nd it advantageous to include suppliers of …rm speci…c human capital). But the general principles operate whether we are considering externalities or suppliers of …rm-speci…c inputs. 13 APPENDIX
A Existence and E¢ ciency
This appendix contains some technical results and proofs relating to the existence of equilibrium and productive e¢ ciency.
Lemma A.1 Let X be a …nite set and let < be a re ‡exive and acyclic binary relation on X: Then there is a <-maximal element of X.
Proof. Choose x 1 2 X arbitrarily. If there does not exist x 2 X; such that x x 1 ; the proof is complete. Otherwise choose x 2 2 X such that x 2 x 1 : De…ne recursively x n+1 to be an element of X such that x n+1 x n if such an element exists. Since X is …nite and < is acyclic, this process must eventually terminate. The …nal point will be a <-maximal element of X.
To prove existence we shall need the following result, which is a generalisation of the Weierstrass theorem. Lemma A.3 Given that consumers satisfy Assumptions 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, …rms satisfy Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11 and 2.10; E is non-empty and closed.
Proof. In the case where y 0 m = 0; one can show an equilibrium exists by adapting the proof of Theorem 7.21 of Ellickson (1993) . This result requires the production and consumption sets to be compact, however it may be adapted to our model as follows. Consider a sequence of truncated economies, where the production and consumption sets are bounded, such that the bounds tend to in…nity as n ! 1.
Let x n ; y 0 cn ; y 0 n ; p n jy 0 mn be the sequence of equilibria of the truncated economies.
The attainable set is compact. By taking convergent subsequences, if necessary, we may assume that x n ; y 0 cn ; y 0 n ; p n and y 0 mn converge to limits x; y 0 c ; y 0 ; p and y 0 m respectively.
We claim that x; y 0 c ; y 0 ; pj y 0 m is a competitive equilibrium relative to y 0 m . Since the consumption and production sets are closed, x and y are feasible. As P H h=1 x nh 6 P H h=1 ! h + y 0 cn ; y 0 mn + y 0 n ; for all n;
if possible, there exists y f 2 Y f such that p; y f ; y f f p; y f ; y f ; for 0 6 f 6 F:
Since the graph of f is open there exists > 0 such that if kp pk < ; k y zk < and y f ; y f w < then hp; wi f hp; zi : For all su¢ ciently large n, kp n pk < ; ky n yk < and
However this contradicts the fact that …rm f is maximising its preferences in the equilibrium hx n ; y n ; p n i : A similar argument shows in h x; y; pi consumers are maximising their preferences. It follows that h x; y; pi 2 E.
Now to demonstrate that E is closed. Let ỹ 0 mn ;p n be a sequence of points from E, which converges to a limit ỹ 0 m ;p : Letỹ n andx n denote the corresponding 27 vectors of equilibrium production and prices. By taking convergent subsequences, if necessary, we may assume thatỹ n andx n converge to limitsỹ andx respectively. By a similar argument to that above we may show that x;ỹ 0 c ;ỹ 0 ;pjỹ 0 m is a competitive equilibrium relative toỹ 0 m , which establishes that E is closed.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 If we normalise prices to lie in the unit simplex, the set E is bounded and therefore compact. Proposition A.2 implies that < has a maximum over this set. It is easy to check that such a maximum is a managerial equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 An equilibrium for a given level of output y 0 is a competitive equilibrium in a particular exchange economy. Since the set of competitive equilibria does not depend on the price normalisation, it follows that the set of competitive equilibria relative to a given output y 0 is also independent of it. Thus, for any given numeraire, the …rm will have the same set of price-quantity combinations to choose from. Since the …rm's preferences are de…ned over real variables, it will choose the same quantities. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
The usual necessary condition for productive e¢ -ciency is that all …rms are on their production frontiers and that all …rms have equal marginal rates of transformation between any pair of goods. (Or that appropriate inequalities are satis…ed at points where the production function is not di¤erentiable.)
Since the production sets are concave these conditions are also su¢ cient for productive e¢ ciency.
As there are no externalities, the Fisher separation theorem can be applied to the competitive …rms. Unanimity implies that these …rms will maximise pro…t. The
Fisher separation theorem can also be applied to the monopolist's trades at the second stage. Thus the second stage is a standard Walrasian equilibrium with pro…t-maximising …rms. For the usual reasons all …rms will set their marginal rate of transformation equal to the price ratio. (Again these are replaced by the appropriate inequalities at points where the production function is not di¤erentiable.) Thus the …rst order conditions for productive e¢ ciency are satis…ed for competitive goods.
Moreover the competitive …rms will be producing on their production frontiers. 
B Externality Model
This appendix contains the proof of the comparative statics result for our externality model. In symmetric equilibrium with pro…t-maximising …rms the following conditions are satis…ed:
g z L ;ẑ = 0;
where g L denotes @g @L etc. Equations (6) and (7) are respectively the …rst order conditions for pro…t maximising choice of pollution and labour input, while equation (8) is the labour-market equilibrium condition.
As explained in section 4.1.2, we may represent the non-pro…t maximising …rm's choice of inputs as maximising a weighted sum of utilities of control group members.
Hence it may be characterised by the solution to the following optimisation problem: The …rst order conditions for (10) are:
The Hessian of this problem is H = 0 @ g LL g Lz g Lz g zz 1 A ; where
The second order condition is that H must be negative semi de…nite at the optimum, which implies that its determinant must be positive, hence
We shall look for a symmetric equilibrium, where L f = L ( ) ; z f = z ( ) for 1 6 f 6 F: The conditions for such an equilibrium are:
g z (L; z) = (z) ;
1 4 We do not need to consider corner solutions where L f = z f = 0; since in this case, it is trivially true that the …rm produces less pollution than the pro…t maximising level.
where
Let the symmetric solution be L ( ) ; z ( ) ; w ( ) : Substituting (14) into (16),
Di¤erentiating (15) and (17) with respect to ; we obtain:
: Note that from our assumptions on the derivatives of D, d and g we have,
0; L S0 g LL F < 0 and g zz 0 (z) < 0: 
h @V h @I h + = 0 for 1 6 h 6 H;
@ @y cj + p cj = 0; for 1 6 j 6 j:
By the envelope theorem, ; for 1 6 h; k 6 H; j + 1 6 j 6 J:
From the consumer's …rst order condition,
; for 1 6 h; k 6 H; 1 6 j 6 j:
From ( 
By concavity, (21), (22), (23) and (24) The consumer's …rst-order condition is:
where the third equality follows from equation (20) . Since (25) is equivalent to (23) the PDM equilibrium can be implemented by the 2-part tari¤.
The above proof assumes that there are no competitive …rms. However, it can be adapted to allow for the presence of competitive …rms.
